Friday, May 31, 2019
The Western World in the Eighteen and Ninteen Hundreds Nature underwent an unbelievable alteration in the way in which it was viewed by man in the Western World in the eighteen and nineteen hundreds. Venturing onto the banks of their land of promise, the first immigrants to the Statess northeast shores found a trackless expanse which, instead of filling them with hope and promise for their newly won future, brought about trepidation and idolise of that most ominous of adversaries the unknown. The untamed wilderness was a frightening proposition to early settlers who were forced to reconsider their hasty renunciation of the rules and structure of civilized society. So as human beings are want to do, they imported their religious intolerance and chronic need to dominate and subjugate nature with them. As life inner(a) the colonies became increasingly structured and illusionary of safety, the Wild outside became correspondingly malevolent as it impinged upon their cozy or der and stasis. Religion go byd unimpeded as the al-Qaida of the colonists beliefs and actions, and its message was successfully used to amplify and solidify their unhealthy fear of nature. Powerful religious figures like Jonathan Edwards used the image of a wilderness same to Hell to strengthen worldly renunciation and recognition of the need for man to conquer his surroundings. With time the concept of nature and mans relationship to it would continue to evolve, but it was not until the visionary philosophy of John Muir in the mid 1900s that the place of nature in religion would be completely turned on its head. By comparing the differences in doctrine set forth by Edwards and Muir, it can be seen how philosophical views of nature came full-circle in early America. In the 1800s, Christianity was a dominating influence over daily life in the New World. The majority of the population lived each day mindful of how their actions in this life would touch their placement in the next. Anticipation of Heaven and fear of Hell were very real governing factors on peoples behavior, and religious leaders of the time played get through of this elevated degree of suggestibility and exploited the ever prevalent fear of the unknown in their preaching. Stories depicting the woods as a rendezvous point for sinners and the chew up were customary, even among the more secular of writers.
Thursday, May 30, 2019
Haverford College did not begin as the institution that it is today. A group of concerned Quakers constructed the secondary school on the premise that it would provide a fine education for Quaker young men. On its founding day in 1833, the Haverford Schools notion of a liberal and guarded education for Quaker boys became a reality. Jumping forward in time to 1870, a decisive change was on the horizon the faculty and students had voted to go coed. However, the Board of Managers did not concede and Haverford remained angiotensin-converting enzyme sex for over a century after the students and faculty had spoken. It wasnt until 1980 that a freshmen class comprised of both men and women entered Haverford. Yet it is the decade prior to 1980 that is the topic of this paper. The serial of about 10 geezerhood before a Haverford female student would unpack her belongings in her room to settle down for four years of an intense and demanding education, both in and out of the classroom, was a time of much reevaluation and consideration on the part of the students, administration, and faculty. The 70s were vibrant and passionate years in the mise en scene of the debate over coeducation as students, faculty, and administrators voiced their opinions often in Haverford and Bryn Mawrs weekly newspaper, The News, forums, interviews, formal discussions, reports, and Collections (school wide meetings) on both Bryn Mawrs and Haverfords campus. The essence of the coeducational debate throw between two camps. One side argued that continued cooperation with Bryn Mawr was the best choice for both schools. The other said that it was time for Haverford to prevent its identity from merging with Bryn Mawrs and to tint out on its own as a coed institution. The battle lines were drawn and the debate continued with zeal for most of the decade. Economics played an important design in the debate. Haverfords President John Coleman saw that Haverfords financial state was in jeopardy if it d id not expand in size. He also saw that by prohibiting 50% of the population in an expansion would decrease the caliber of students at Haverford. Bryn Mawrs president Wofford felt passionately that the fate of Bryn Mawr rested on the decision of Haverford. His concerns were exacerbated by the seemingly coercive patterns Haverfords Board of Managers set by claiming to let the issue of coeducation rest but then by addressing the possibility again each year.
Wednesday, May 29, 2019
The Relationship of Freedom to the Acquisition, Possession, and Exercise of Virtue :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays
ABSTRACT There are three common expostulations that all by and large Aristotelian virtue theorist must face, insofar as he or she holds that acts must be performed from a firm and stable propensity in order to express virtue, and that virtue is in some way a praiseworthy fulfillment of human potential. Each of these objections accuses the virtuous person of non amply exercising his or her rationality and freedom, and thence of being somehow less than fully human. There are three common objections that any broadly Aristotelian virtue theorist must face, insofar as he or she holds that acts must be performed from a firm and stable angle of inclination in order to be called acts expressing virtue, and that virtue is in some way a praiseworthy fulfillment of human potential. Each of these objections accuse the virtuous person of not fully exercising his or her rationality and freedom, and thus of being somehow less than fully human. The first objection is that acts flowing from t he firm and stable disposition of virtue need not be expressions of rationality and freedom, since they may be performed by rote.The second objection, related to the first, has to do with the voluntariness of the possession of virtue. Those who hold that the virtues must be firm and stable dispositions generally hold that a good upbringing from childhood is of utmost importance in the acquisition of such dispositions. The second objection is thus as follows if a persons virtue depends upon her upbringing, then she is not responsible for her virtue it was not up to her and she deserves no praise. The first objection, then, is that fussy acts from a firm disposition of virtue are not fully rational or free the second objection is that the acquisition of the dispositions themselves is not fully rational or free, since it depends upon upbringing. If neither the possession nor the exercise of virtue need be rational and free, then it seems that the activity of virtue is less than fully human, and thus cannot be the praiseworthy fulfillment of our human potential.The third objection, like the second, also has to do with the importance of ones upbringing to the virtuous life, but is a bit more pointed. Those who present the third objection argue that the acquisition of virtue, inasmuch as it requires such a directive upbringing, itself constitutes a limitation of ones freedom.